SUBJECTIVE PERFORMANCE MEASURES IN OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS

SUBJECTIVE PERFORMANCE MEASURES IN OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS

Incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate
incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures. This paper explores the
combined use of subjective and objective performance measures in (respectively)
implicit and explicit incentive contracts. We show that the presence of sufficiently
effective explicit contracts can render all implicit contracts infeasible, even those that
would otherwise yield the first-best. We also show, however, that in some
circumstances objective and subjective measures are complements: neither an explicit
nor an implicit contract alone yields positive profit, but an appropriate combination of
the two does. Finally, we consider subjective weights on objective measures.

A Non-Technical Introduction to Bargaining Theory

A Non-Technical Introduction to Bargaining Theory

...
What variables (or factors) determine the outcome of negotiations such
as those mentioned above? What are the sources of bargaining power?
What strategies can help improve one’s bargaining power? What variables
determine whether parties to a territorial dispute will reach a negotiated
settlement, or engage in military war? How can one enhance the likelihood
that parties in such negotiations will strike an agreement quickly so
as to minimise the loss of life through war? What strategies should one
adopt to maximise the negotiated sale price of one’s house? How can one
negotiate a better deal (such as a wage increase) from one’s employers?

RELATIONAL CONTRACTS AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM

RELATIONAL CONTRACTS AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM

Relational contracts—informal agreements sustained by the value of future
relationships—are prevalent within and between firms. We develop repeated-game
models showing why and how relational contracts within firms (vertical integration)
differ from those between (non-integration). We show that integration affects the
parties’ temptations to renege on a given relational contract, and hence affects the best
relational contract the parties can sustain. In this sense, the integration decision can be
an instrument in the service of the parties’ relationship. Our approach also has
implications for joint ventures, alliances, and networks, and for the role of
management within and between firms.

Ideas

Goals
A truly strategic online multiplayer game

Means
Actively prosecute micromanagement
Provide advisors to implement strategic decisions, even in absence of the player
Protect playability by using reputation

Canvas
Supply chains of enormous complexity (orders of magnitude more complex than Settlers TM)

Tutorial
Players start as hired work force for other players/bots

Gameplay
Players engage in contracts with each other
There is always a risk of your partner failing - use insurance, redundancy, and reputation

Side effects
Social networking

References
Settlers
SimCity
x-battle
* Tycoon

Challenges
Language for contracts
Language for strategic plans

Miscellaneous
Transport topology - relevant or not? A spectrum from vital to relevant to cosmetic to non-existant.
Ownership of land lots. Parceling?
And other real estate.
Roads and tolls. Ports and airports. Railroads and stations.
Factories.
Carriers.
Financial: loans, deposits, transfers. Stocks? Derivatives?
Legal: contracts and lawsuits. Bankruptcy.
Insurance.
Market. Sales. Advertising. Media.
Warehouses.
Retailers.
Residentials. Rent.
Packaging.
Energy.
Communications.
Business processes as property.
Research.

Strategic map - towns (municipalities) as points with attached ports, industries, and population. Connected by roads, railroads, water and air transport.
Town map - grid (or polygonal map?) of land lots.

Industries
Aerospace, food, agri, auto, chem, energy, electronics, machinery, medicinal, metal, entertainment, textile, wood&paper

Pilot Scope
Only strategic map.
Simplified economy (only parts of raw resources and industries, some transportation - roads and water, maybe energy, no sales, no financials, no legal, no insurance). Basically Middle Ages, or even antiquity - except for workforce.
No military conflict.
A game is a set of towns, plus a connectivity matrix or two (roads/water).
Each town contains population, industries, materials; and has attached raw resources availability (lumbering/farming/fishing/mining for several minerals).
Towns/neighborhoods have limited capacity for industries, so that supply chains are forced to distribute across towns.

Maybe: using vector maps to bridge the gap between strategic/town maps - there are just various LODs.
Still need some atomic map unit for purposes of logistics (site?).
Maybe: each facility' design has some polygonal footprint plus rules for internal logistics. These footprints can be freely rotated, and can have requirements on their placement (water, resources, etc.).
Research GIS systems.

3D -> features (peak/pit/pass/ridge/valley) -> drainage network -> resource distribution

http://www.carto.net/papers/svg/samples
http://www.carto.net/papers/svg/mapbrowser/index.svgz